أثر قاعدة «النادر لا حكم له» في القواعد الأصولية "دراسة تأصيلية تطبيقية في نماذج مختارة"

Abstract

This research examines the usul al-fiqh function of the principle ‘The rare has no ruling’, through an inductive analysis of examples drawn from the meanings of terms, legal evidence, methods of deduction, weighing of probabilities and ijtihad. The central issue lies in determining the principle’s place within the usul al-fiqh framework: does it stand as an independent piece of evidence, or does it function as an inductive indicator that governs the interpretation of meanings and the weighing of probabilities? The study adopted a comparative, inductive-analytical methodology, clarifying the points of contention in each issue and linking the various legal opinions to their stance on what is prevalent and what is rare. It concluded that the rule does not independently establish a legal ruling, but rather serves as an auxiliary approach based on a disciplined principle of prevalence; thus, the apparent meaning is not contradicted by a mere rare possibility, nor is the rare case negated if it is established by specific evidence or if the basis of the ruling pertains to it. It also became apparent that the correct application of the rule depends on distinguishing between the rare case falling within the general rule by implication, and the general rule being restricted to it from the outset; between the mere possibility of particularity and the existence of evidence of particularity; and between consistency that gives rise to presumption and mere conventional association.